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Closed head injury (CHI) is associated with communication difficulties in everyday social interactions. Previous work has
reported impaired comprehension of sarcasm, using sarcastic remarks where the intended meaning is the opposite of the sincere
or literal meaning. Participants with CHI in the present study were assessed using two types of sarcastic items, those with a directly
opposite meaning and those with an indirect, non-literal but not directly opposite meaning. The CHI group was differentially poorer
at comprehending sarcastic versus sincere remarks, although type of sarcastic materials did not influence performance. Errors
involved not only literal interpretations, but also incorrect non-literal interpretations. Theory of mind (mentalising) was also
assessed by comparing comprehension of human actions with control physical events. The CHI group was selectively impaired
on the mentalising component of this task, and mentalising scores correlated with sarcasm comprehension. The implications of
the findings for our understanding of impaired sarcastic comprehension after acquired brain injury are discussed.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The interpretation of much of what people say and
do is affected by the social context in which it takes
place, i.e., the setting, the people present, the relation-
ship between them, and their beliefs and intentions. Re-
search to date has shown that processing pragmatic
communications involving non-literal meanings such
as indirect requests, humour, deception and sarcasm
may pose particular difficulties after brain injury, despite
intact ability to process syntactic and semantic aspects
of language. Ability to interpret pragmatic language
appropriately in social interactions is fundamental to
successful functioning in many aspects of everyday life,
and is commonly disrupted by brain damage. Impair-
ment in processing pragmatic materials including the
interpretation of ambiguous advertisements, story vign-
ettes including lies, sarcasm, humour and so on has been0093-934X/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2004.09.002
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E-mail address: s.channon@ucl.ac.uk (S. Channon).reported in adults with right hemisphere lesions (e.g.,
Brownell, Simpson, Bihrle, Potter, & Gardner, 1990;
Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998), and
more recently in those with frontal lobe lesions and
closed head injury (CHI) (e.g., Channon & Crawford,
2000; Pearce, McDonald, & Coltheart, 1998; Shamay,
Tomer, & Aharon-Peretz, 2002). In addition to the
above studies, which have concentrated on impaired
pragmatic language processing in clinical populations
where language development was normal until adult-
hood, pragmatic difficulties have also been described in
children after CHI (e.g., Dennis, Purvis, Barnes, Wilkin-
son, & Winner, 2001) and in neurodevelopmental disor-
ders, particularly autism (e.g., Dennis, Lazenby, &
Lockyer, 2001; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996) and schizophre-
nia (e.g., Corcoran et al., 1995; Mitchley, Barber, Gray,
Brooks, & Livingston, 1998). Other neurodevelopmental
disorders such as Williams syndrome and Prader–Willi
syndrome have also been associated with difficulties in
pragmatic language processing (e.g., Sullivan, Winner,
& Tager-Flusberg, 2003).
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adult-acquired deficits in social cognition, since it is
associated with marked difficulties in social communica-
tion, with impaired processing of pragmatic materials
despite intact primary language abilities (e.g., Brooks,
Campsie, Symington, Beattie, & McKinlay, 1986;
McDonald, 2000). Impairment in processing pragmatic
meaning appropriately according to the social context
has been reported after CHI in adults using a range of
materials (e.g., Bara, Tirassa, & Zettin, 1997; McDonald
& Pearce, 1996). Studying CHI thus provides an oppor-
tunity to examine processes underpinning pragmatic
language deficits.
Sarcasm is a common and relatively complex form of
pragmatic communication. Varying definitions of sar-
casm and irony appear in the literature, beyond the
scope of the present discussion; some refer to sarcasm
and irony interchangeably, some treat sarcasm as one
form of irony, and others separate the two, for instance
with the distinction that sarcasm is targeted at a partic-
ular victim, whereas irony is not (see, e.g., Gibbs, 2000;
Jorgensen, 1996; Katz, 2000; Kreutz & Glucksberg,
1989; McDonald, 1999). In our use of the term sarcasm
here, we refer to remarks made with negative or critical
intent, where there is an indirect meaning, i.e., a discrep-
ancy between the literal meaning of the words and the
social context. Early models of pragmatic language
comprehension postulated that literal meanings were
automatically processed before indirect meanings could
be accessed (e.g., Grice, 1975), based on detecting con-
tradiction between the social context of the remark
and the literal meaning. Others have disputed whether
literal meanings are necessarily processed and inter-
preted before non-literal meanings. For instance, Giora
(1999) argued that the most salient meaning in the rele-
vant context was processed, whether or not this was the
literal meaning. Dews and Winner (1995) suggested that
the literal meaning was processed, but not replaced;
rather, this literal meaning contributed to the interpreta-
tion of the indirect meaning in the social context, for in-
stance by colouring negative meanings so that they are
perceived to be less critical. It has also been argued that
comprehension is driven by the social context, such that
neither the literal nor salient meaning is necessarily pro-
cessed if a sufficiently rich context cues interpretation of
the correct indirect meaning (see, e.g., Gibbs, 2002; for a
discussion).
Developmental models of pragmatic comprehension
have postulated stages of processing that depend upon
the complexity of the materials. The most commonly
used form of sarcasm involves reversal of the direct
meaning. This type of sarcasm is referred to here as di-
rect sarcasm, and has been labelled differently by differ-
ent authors; Grice (1989) referred to it as ‘‘antiphrastic
irony,’’ Dews et al. (1996) as ‘‘direct irony,’’ and Bucc-
iarelli, Colle, and Bara (2003) as ‘‘simple irony.’’ Sarcas-tic remarks are also made with more indirect meanings
(i.e., different from, but not directly opposite to, the lit-
eral meaning), referred to here as ‘‘indirect sarcasm’’;
this type of sarcasm has been labelled ‘‘indirect irony’’
(Dews et al., 1996) or ‘‘complex irony’’ (Bucciarelli
et al., 2003). For example, Bosco et al. (2004) gave the
following example: ‘‘Alex takes out from a toaster two
completely burned pieces of toast. Mary arrives and
Alex asks with a puzzled expression: Am I a good
cook? Mary answers. . . ’’ The best cook in the world!
(‘‘simple irony,’’ referred to here as direct sarcasm) or
Ill hire you in my restaurant (‘‘complex irony,’’ re-
ferred to here as indirect sarcasm). There is some evi-
dence of developmental stages in the comprehension of
these two types of sarcastic remark. For instance, Dews
et al. (1996) reported that young children (aged 6–7) did
not appreciate the perceived funniness of the more sub-
tle type of indirect sarcasm in the same way as older chil-
dren (8–9) and adults. Children aged 6–10 have been
found to show better comprehension of simpler speech
acts including direct versus indirect sarcasm (Bosco
and Bucciarelli, reported in Bosco et al., 2004), and a
similar pattern was found for children aged 6–8 for di-
rect versus indirect sarcasm where facial and body ges-
tures rather than words were used to indicate sarcasm
(Bosco et al., 2004). It is not clear whether the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect forms of sarcasm re-
ported in children at different developmental stages
applies to adults with acquired brain injury, since com-
prehension of indirect sarcasm has not been explored
with the latter group. There is evidence of impairment
in adults with traumatic brain injury in the comprehen-
sion of direct sarcastic remarks, compared to sincere,
non-sarcastic remarks (McDonald & Pearce, 1996).
The present study was designed to compare comprehen-
sion of both direct and indirect sarcastic remarks in
adults with acquired brain injury after CHI.
Previous work assessing comprehension of direct
sarcasm found that CHI was associated with literal er-
rors, and interpreted this as support for the view that
the literal meanings of the sarcastic remarks were pro-
cessed before non-literal meanings (McDonald &
Pearce, 1996). If CHI leads to literal errors in interpret-
ing sarcasm, this indicates failure to appreciate the
non-literal nature of the communication. However,
Gibbs (2002) argued that literal errors in this study
were a function of the particular materials used. The
sarcastic stimuli consisted of two statements, such as
Mark: ‘‘What a great football game,’’ followed by
Wayne: ‘‘Sorry I made you come.’’ Yes/no answers
were used to assess comprehension. Gibbs pointed
out that there was no particular reason to make an
inference other than the obvious literal one in relation
to the first statement, and that a failure to re-evaluate
this when followed by a contradictory statement such
as the example above would therefore lead to an erro-
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signed to test whether CHI was associated primarily
with literal errors when sarcastic remarks were pre-
sented in a more detailed social context, and partici-
pants were asked to explain the meaning of the
remarks verbally. This permitted us to distinguish be-
tween errors arising from failures to recognise non-lit-
eral meanings and errors reflecting recognition of a
non-literal meaning, but incorrect interpretation of that
meaning.
One important factor that may influence ability to
comprehend sarcasm is theory of mind or mentalising
ability to infer others beliefs and intentions. Mentalising
has been linked in the neuropsychological and neuroi-
maging literature to the medial frontal lobes (e.g., Galla-
gher & Frith, 2003; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001).
First-order mentalising tasks are passed around the
age of 4 by typically developing children (e.g., Wimmer
& Permer, 1983), and second-order mentalising ability
(e.g., A thinks that B thinks that. . .) develops around
the age of 6 (e.g., Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Mentalising
skills are thought to develop further with increasing age,
involving ability to infer more complex mental states,
such as double-bluff, which can be understood at around
the age of 8 (Happé, 1994), although there are no widely
used tests assessing adult-level mentalising skills. There
is evidence linking mentalising ability to sarcasm com-
prehension (see Creusere, 1999). For instance, second-
order mentalising performance has been found to be
associated with childrens ability to recognise direct sar-
casm (e.g., Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995; Winner
& Leekam, 1991). A similar finding was reported for
adults with right hemisphere lesions (Winner et al.,
1998). This implies that impaired processing of direct
sarcasm after adult-acquired CHI may also be linked
to mentalising deficits. It is unclear from the existing lit-
erature whether CHI in adults is associated with specific
difficulties in mentalising, since performance was found
to be intact on a simple first-order mentalising task
(Bara et al., 1997) and another study reported difficulties
in both mentalising and non-mentalising components of
the task (Santoro & Spiers, 1994). Other studies report-
ing impairment in participants with CHI have used
pragmatic language judgement tasks that may be influ-
enced by a range of factors other than mentalising
(e.g., Channon & Watts, 2003; Levine, Van Horn, &
Curtis, 1993; Milders, Fuchs, & Crawford, 2003). The
contribution of mentalising ability was assessed in the
present study using materials similar in structure to
those devised to assess sarcasm comprehension.
The relationship between mentalising skills and com-
prehension of indirect sarcasm has not been investi-
gated, to our knowledge. Bosco et al. (2004) imply a
central role of mentalising ability in their cognitive mod-
el of pragmatic processing, since they contend that the
shared belief of the participants in the dialogue is centralto comprehension of sarcasm. With respect to the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect sarcasm, these
authors suggest that direct sarcasm can be understood
by a simple inference, that the literal meaning of the re-
mark contrasts with the shared belief that this is not
true, and that the opposite meaning can therefore be in-
ferred. They argue that indirect sarcasm is also depen-
dent on the shared belief of the participants, but is
differentiated from direct sarcasm by the fact that a
longer inferential chain is needed to comprehend the re-
mark; for instance, the example above involves shared
knowledge both that Alex is not a good cook, and that
cooks in restaurants need to be good, to comprehend the
indirect meaning. Translating this into a neuropsycho-
logical perspective, it is not clear whether Bosco et al.s
model implicates higher levels of mentalising ability as
the key factor mediating ability to comprehend longer
inferential chains, or whether other processes such as
executive skills are also required.
Another possible factor contributing to deficits in
pragmatic processing is impairment in social knowledge
relating to everyday pragmatic language usage. Knowl-
edge about when people use sarcasm and other types of
pragmatic language evolves through life experience,
both from direct interaction with others and indirectly
through the media and so on. Social knowledge may
be affected directly by acquired brain injury, or the effi-
ciency of strategic access to and usage of such knowl-
edge may be affected (see Channon, 2004). This issue
has received little attention to date, and was investigated
in the present study.
The focus of the present study was therefore to inves-
tigate sarcasm comprehension after acquired brain in-
jury, using both direct sarcasm, already shown to be
impaired after CHI, and indirect sarcasm, not previ-
ously studied after CHI. The main prediction was that
CHI would be associated with selective difficulties in
the comprehension of sarcastic versus sincere materials,
and that this would be related to mentalising ability and
to social knowledge about sarcasm. The study also ex-
plored whether comprehension of indirect sarcasm was
differentially more impaired than comprehension of di-
rect sarcasm after CHI, since greater difficulty with indi-
rect sarcasm has previously been described in the normal
developmental literature. No specific prediction was
made with respect to direct versus indirect sarcasm,
since no previous work has examined this distinction
after adult-acquired injury.2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure
Nineteen participants (15m, 4f) who had suffered
CHI as a result of a blunt impact were recruited from
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To be included in the study, participants had to be be-
tween 18 and 60 years of age, fluent in English, within
the normal range on the Test of Reception of Grammar
(TROG) (Bishop, 1989), and to have suffered their in-
jury at least one year ago. Exclusion criteria included
alcohol or drug dependence, significant neurological or
psychiatric illness before head injury. Participants were
also excluded if they had a premorbid verbal IQ score
below 80 on the WTAR (Wechsler, 2001), or had expres-
sive or receptive dysphasia. Fifteen of the sample were
injured in road traffic accidents, one in a plane accident,
one in an assault, and two in falls. Medical information
was obtained from hospital or GP records, and also
from patients and their relatives. The duration of post-
traumatic amnesia, i.e., the time between injury and
the reinstatement of continuous memory, was used to
determine severity of head injury (Jennett & Teasdale,
1981). This classified 4 of the sample in the severe range
of 1–7 days, 10 in the very severe range of 1–4 weeks,
and 5 in the extremely severe range of more than 4
weeks (shown in Table 1). Mean duration of time
since injury was 9.68 years (SD 9.10). Anatomical
information about brain damage was limited, since the
only scans available had been performed immediately
after injury before the final picture of tissue damage
emerged, and CT, a far less sensitive methodology for
revealing lesions after CHI than MRI, was often used
(see Table 1).Table 1









1 27 10 3 CT R frontal
2 26 13 2 CT L frontot
3 35 18 3 CT L small t
4 18 38 2 MRI L and R
5 18 24 1 MRI L frontal
6 28 6 2 CT Normal
7 39 15 2 CT Normal,
8 53 6 2 CT R tempor
9 36 13 3 CT L frontop
10 46 10 2 CT L frontop
11 42 3 2 CT L brainst
12 58 6 1 CT Normal
13 46 2 3 CT R trauma
with sma
14 28 7 3 MRI L frontot
of L subd
15 52 1 1 Unknown Not avail
16 31 12 2 CT L capsule
17 33 5 2 CT L thalam
18 22 1 2 CT Normal
19 49 2 1 CT L hemisp
CT: computed tomography; MRI: magnetic resonance imaging; L: left; R: r
a 1, severe; 2, very severe; 3, extremely severe.Nineteen healthy normal participants (13m, 6f) who
matched the CHI group in terms of age, years of educa-
tion and IQ were also included. The groups did not differ
significantly in age (CHI mean 45.74, SD 10.03, control
mean 44.89, SD 9.88), t(36) = 0.26, p = .796, years of
education (CHI mean 13.05, SD 1.99, control mean
13.47, SD 1.93), t(36) = 0.66, p = .511, or WTAR Full
Scale IQ (CHI mean 103.74, SD 9.53, control mean
106.89, SD 8.58), t(36) = 1.07, p = .290. All participants
gave written informed consent for the study, and were
given breaks between tasks as necessary, to avoid
fatigue.
2.2. Sarcasm comprehension task
The sarcasm comprehension task consisted of 18 brief
scenarios describing a social context, ending with a single
remark by one character. Two different types of sarcastic
remark were included: remarks that could be understood
by reversal of the direct meaning, and remarks that were
indirectly related but could not be solved by direct. These
were compared with sincere remarks, where the social
context of the story was congruent with the direct mean-
ing of the remark. Examples of the item types are pre-
sented below. There were six items in each category.
The item sets were matched in length and presented in
pseudo-randomised order. To reduce memory load, each
story remained on the screen throughout. Participants
read the stories, and were asked to explain verbally whatcontusion, small L occipital subdural contusion
emporal infarct, low density area in posterior limb of internal capsule
halamic haemorrhage and posterior limb of internal capsule
temporal contusions, L parietal subdural
and periventricular damage
skull fracture




tic subarachnoid haemorrhage, L temporal lobe contusions
ll subdural haematoma




ic, internal capsule and superior cerebellar peduncle contusions
here oedema, narrowing of L lateral ventricle
ight.
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sponses, a score of two points was given for responses
giving a clear correct explanation of the action/event, a
score of one point when the answer was not incorrect,
but was not adequately explained, and a score of zero
points when the answer was incorrect or irrelevant. After
participants had read each item and made a verbal
response, they were presented with four alternative inter-
pretations, in pseudo-randomised order. These included
two correct interpretations (a direct correct interpreta-
tion, and a more indirect but still correct interpretation)
and two incorrect interpretations (an irrelevant interpre-
tation), and a clearly incorrect interpretation that for the
sarcastic (but not the sincere) items provided a salient,
literal interpretation of the remark. They were then
asked to answer a yes/no non-mentalistic factual infer-
ence question, to check understanding of the social con-
text of the story.
2.2.1. Example of a sincere item
One week, Carlas husband came home late every
night. Carla started to worry. At the end of the week,
she went to the bank. She found that there was no
money in their account. Her husband confessed that
he had been gambling and lost a lot of money.
Carla said: ‘‘That was very stupid of you!’’
Question 1: What did Carla mean when she said that?2.2.2. Example of a direct sarcastic item
Vicky had bought tickets for a new play at the the-
atre. One was for herself and the other for her friend
Jean. Vicky told Jean the play would be good because
her favourite actor was in it. The play turned out to
be terrible. They were both disappointed.
Jean said: ‘‘That was a fantastic play you tookme to see!’’
Question: What did Jean mean when she said that?
Incorrect non-literal interpretation:
‘‘She was being polite to her friend, because her friend
liked it.’’
Failure to make non-literal interpretation:
‘‘She was pleased that she was involved in seeing the
theatre.’’
‘‘She thought it was a fantastic play.’’2.2.3. Example of an indirect sarcastic item
Liz and her friend often played tennis. Her friend al-
ways wanted to be best at everything. One day they were
playing tennis in the local park. Liz knew that her friend
expected to win the game. However, that day her friend
did not win. Liz said:‘‘I suppose youll say theres a hole in your racket!’’
Question: What did Liz mean when she said that?
Incorrect non-literal interpretation:
‘‘She let her friend win.’’
‘‘Youre not as good as me in this game. Youre not a
match.’’
Failure to make non-literal interpretation:
‘‘She thought that because there was a hole in the racket,
she was losing all the points.’’2.2.4. Task properties
Data from the healthy control participants were ini-
tially examined to establish the properties of the task,
using both items correct and means of median time
taken to respond. Paired t test comparison of verbal
responses for the combined sarcastic items with the
sincere items showed significantly higher scores for
the sincere than for the sarcastic items (sincere mean
97.37, SD 3.98; sarcastic mean 92.11, SD 10.03;
p = .014); time taken did not differ significantly for
the item sets (sincere mean 13.92 s, SD 5.02; sarcastic
mean 14.04 s, SD 5.36; p > .05). Selection of alterna-
tives did not reveal differences between the item types
for correct choices (sincere mean 99.12, SD 3.82; indi-
rect mean 97.81, SD 3.77) or time taken to respond
(sincere mean 7.23 s, SD 2.92; sarcastic mean 7.08 s,
SD 2.40; p > .05). The sarcastic items therefore ap-
peared slightly more difficult than the sincere items
for the control participants when verbal scores were
considered, and were similar to the sincere items on
all other indices.
Paired t test comparison of the two types of sar-
casm, direct and indirect, showed no significant differ-
ences between these for verbal responses in either
percentage scores achieved (direct mean 89.04, SD
11.13; indirect mean 95.18, SD 8.92; p > .05) or time
taken to respond (direct mean 12.97 s, SD 6.56; indi-
rect mean 15.11 s, SD 5.11; p > .05). When selection
of alternatives was examined, there were ceiling effects
for correct choices (direct mean 100.00, SD .00; indi-
rect mean 95.61, SD 7.54); time taken to respond did
not differ significantly for the two item types (direct
mean 6.88 s, SD 2.79; indirect mean 7.29 s, SD 2.74;
p > .05). Overall, there was little evidence that these
item types differed in difficulty for the control
participants.
2.3. Action comprehension task
This task was similar in structure to the sarcasm com-
prehension task, and was designed to assess mentalising
skills by comparing scenarios ending with human ac-
128 S. Channon et al. / Brain and Language 93 (2005) 123–134tions or control physical events rather than with sarcas-
tic or sincere remarks. For the six mentalistic action
items, it was necessary to take into account the mental
state of the character to interpret the actions. For the
six control physical event items, there was always a char-
acter in the story, but there was no need to infer a men-
tal state to explain the physical event. Examples of the
two types are presented below. As for the sarcasm com-
prehension task, the item sets were matched in length
and presented in pseudo-randomised order. Participants
read the stories, which remained on the screen through-
out, and were asked to explain verbally why the charac-
ter carried out the action or why the physical event
happened. A score of two points was given for responses
giving a clear correct explanation of the action/event, a
score of one point when the answer was not incorrect,
but was not adequately explained, and a score of zero
points when the answer was incorrect or irrelevant. Par-
ticipants were then presented with four alternative inter-
pretations (in pseudo-randomised order within each
item set), two correct and two incorrect, and a yes/no
factual inference question, as for the sarcasm compre-
hension task.
2.3.1. Example of a physical event item
Kenneth grew vegetables in his garden. There were
rows of carrots, potatoes, and cabbages. One morning
hewent to pick a cabbage.Wire fencing protected the veg-
etable patch. The metal had rusted and there was a small
hole in the fencing. Kenneth walked over to the cabbages.
There were no cabbages left in the patch.
Question: Why were there no cabbages left?2.3.2. Example of a mentalistic action item
Dave wanted to impress his new girlfriend Marie. He
was cooking her a meal, but had never cooked before.
Marie hoped it would be successful. Dave told her he
had spent all day preparing it. When it came out of
the oven it was badly burnt. Marie ate all her meal.
Afterwards she took a second helping of the food.
Question: Why did Marie take a second helping?2.3.3. Task properties
The properties of the task were initially examined for
the healthy control participants, using both items cor-
rect and means of median time taken to respond. Paired
t test comparison of the mentalistic action versus phys-
ical event item types showed no significant differences
between these for verbal response scores (mentalistic ac-
tion mean 96.93, SD 4.98; physical event 99.12, SD 3.82;
p > .05) or time taken to respond (mentalistic action
mean 10.82 s, SD 5.21; physical event mean 9.42 s, SD
3.55; p > .05). Selection of alternatives did not reveal dif-
ferences between the item types for correct choices,which were at ceiling (100%) for both mentalistic actions
and physical events, or for time taken to respond (men-
talistic action mean 5.31 s, SD 2.20; physical event mean
5.28 s, SD 2.08; p > .05). The difficulty of the two types
of items therefore appeared similar for the control
participants.
2.4. Social usage of sarcasm task
Participants were asked to make ratings on a four-
point scale (see below) of how likely it would be for
someone to be sarcastic to a range of people. These in-
cluded three familiar people and three less familiar peo-
ple (see example below). They were also asked to make
ratings on a four-point scale (see below) of how appro-
priate it would be to use sarcasm in a range of situations.
These included three informal situations and three for-
mal situations (see below). These ratings were averaged
for the purposes of analysis.
2.4.1. Example of familiar person
How likely, in general, would it be for someone to be






unlikely2.4.2. Example of unfamiliar person
How likely, in general, would it be for someone to be
sarcastic to the following person?





unlikely2.4.3. Example of informal situation
How appropriate, in general, would it be to be






inappropriate2.4.4. Example of informal situation
How appropriate, in general, would it be to be
sarcastic in the following situation?






The properties of the task were initially examined for
the healthy control participants. Paired t test compari-
son of the ratings for people showed that they rated
the use of sarcasm as significantly more likely for famil-
iar people than for strangers (familiar mean 88.16, SD
13.12; strangers 50.00, SD 10.76; p = .0001). Similarly,
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in informal situations compared to formal situations
(informal mean 75.44, SD 13.46; formal mean 29.82,
SD 5.06; p < .05). The ratings of social usage therefore
appeared to differ in the expected direction for the con-
trol participants.3. Results
Mean scores, standard deviations and significance
tests for scores on the cognitive tasks are shown in TableTable 2
Mean scores and standard deviations for the social and non-social measures
CHI grou
Mean
Sarcasm comprehension task (%)
Verbal response score
Indirect sarcastic items 77.19
Direct sarcastic items 72.81
Sincere items 92.54
Errors for indirect sarcastic responses
Inadequate responses 19.30
Incorrect non-literal responses 8.77
Failures to make non-literal responses 3.51
Irrelevant responses 0.88
Errors for direct sarcastic responses
Inadequate responses 24.56
Incorrect non-literal responses 6.14
Failures to make non-literal responses 6.14
Irrelevant responses 2.63
Selection of alternatives
Indirect sarcastic alternatives 93.86
Direct sarcastic alternatives 92.98
Sincere alternatives 96.49
Factual inference
Indirect sarcastic items 94.74
Direct sarcastic items 96.49
Sincere items 95.61
Action comprehension task (%)
Verbal response score
Mentalistic action items 84.21







Social knowledge task (%)a
Likelihood ratings—familiar people 75.46
Likelihood ratings—strangers 53.24
Appropriateness ratings—informal situations 72.69
Appropriateness ratings—formal situations 37.50
a N = 18 for CHI group.2. A significance level of. 05 was adopted throughout,
with adjustment for post hoc tests as specified below.
3.1. Sarcasm comprehension task
3.1.1. Sarcastic versus sincere items
The combined sarcastic items were initially compared
with the sincere items for the two groups. ANOVA
showed a significant group by item type interaction,
F (1,36) = 10.66, p = .002 and a significant main effect
of group, F (1,36) = 23.00, p = .0001. Post hoc t tests
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ference did not reach significance on the sincere items,
t (24.6) = 2.10, p = .046, but that the CHI group had sig-
nificantly greater difficulties in interpreting the sarcastic
items, t(26.4) = 4.88, p = .0001.
Comparison of the alternatives chosen for the com-
bined sarcastic items versus the sincere items showed
no significant group by item type interaction,
F (1,36) = 0.56, p = .458, but the main effect of group
was significant, F (1,36) = 4.36, p = .044, showing the
CHI group to score below the control group. Errors in
selecting alternatives were relatively rare for both
groups. Examination of responses showed that 5.26%
of choices for the CHI group involved literal errors on
the sarcastic items, and the control group made 2.19%;
the CHI group also chose 1.32% irrelevant alternatives;
no alternatives of this type were chosen by the control
group.
For the factual inference questions, ANOVA for the
combined sarcastic items and sincere items showed no
significant group by type of item interaction,
F (36) = 0.05, p = .817, nor effect of group, F (36) =
0.73, p = .400.
3.1.2. Direct versus indirect sarcastic items
The CHI and control groups were then compared on
the direct and indirect sarcastic item types. ANOVA for
the verbal interpretation scores showed no significant
group by item type interaction, F (1,36) = 0.08,
p = .779, but there was a significant effect of group,
F (1,36) = 23.84, p = .0001, showing the CHI partici-
pants to score below the control group.
All incorrect answers scoring 0 points were categor-
ised for the direct and indirect sarcastic items to examine
the types of mistakes they were making (see Table 2).
The remaining errors (awarded 1 point) were those in
which the verbal responses were not incorrect, but were
not explained in sufficient detail to score fully. Three
types of errors scoring 0 points were identified: incorrect
non-literal interpretations that wrongly interpreted the
meaning of the remark; failures to make non-literal
interpretations, interpreting the remark literally; and
irrelevant answers. ANOVA comparing the groups in
the number of incorrect non-literal interpretations for
the direct and indirect sarcastic items showed no signif-
icant group by item type interaction, F (1,36) = 0.98,
p = .329, but there was a significant effect of group,
F (1,36) = 8.82, p = .005, showing the CHI participants
to score below the control group. Similarly for the num-
ber of failures to make non-literal interpretations, there
was no significant group by item type interaction,
F (1,36) = 1.00, p = .324, but there was a significant ef-
fect of group, F (1,36) = 5.32, p = .027, again showing
the CHI participants to score below the control group.
There were no irrelevant responses for the control group
for either the direct or indirect sarcastic items, and onlya few for the CHI group. Examples of errors involving
incorrect non-literal responses and failures to make
non-literal interpretations are shown Section 2.
When selection of alternatives was examined for the
direct and indirect sarcastic items, ANOVA showed no
significant group by item type interaction, F (1,36) =
2.70, p = .109, but there was a significant effect of group
showing the CHI group to score below the controls,
F (1,36) = 5.63, p = .023.
3.2. Action comprehension task
3.2.1. Group comparison of mentalistic actions versus
physical event items
The CHI and control groups were compared using
ANOVA to examine verbal responses on the task across
the two item types (mentalistic action or physical event).
This showed a significant group by condition interac-
tion, F (1,36) = 6.56, p = .015, and there was a signifi-
cant main effect of group, F (1,36) = 10.29, p = .003.
Post hoc t tests using an adjusted level of significance
(.05/2 = .025) with separate variance estimates showed
that the groups did not differ significantly on the physi-
cal events, t (29.4) = 1.54, p = .135, but that the CHI
group had significantly greater difficulties in interpreting
the mentalistic actions, t (21.1) = 3.15, p = .005.
Selection of alternatives was also examined for the
two conditions. Two of the alternative responses were
correct, and two were incorrect. The control group
was found to be at ceiling on both the mentalistic ac-
tions and physical events. Seventeen out of 19 CHI par-
ticipants also performed at ceiling on the control
physical event items and 15 out of 19 CHI participants
performed at ceiling on the mentalistic action items
(see Table 2). Thus, there was little evidence of difficul-
ties for the CHI group when they were offered choices
including correct alternatives. For the factual inference
questions, ANOVA showed no significant group by type
of item interaction, F (36) = 1.67, p = .205, nor effect of
group, F (36) = 2.61, p = .115.
3.3. Social usage of sarcasm task
For the likeliness and appropriateness ratings,
ANOVA showed no significant group by type of rating
by formality (familiar/informal versus stranger/formal)
interaction, F (1,35) = 0.71, p = .407. There was a signif-
icant group by type of rating interaction, F (1,35) = 5.29,
p = .028, and also a significant group by formality inter-
action, F (1,35) = 5.54, p = .024; the effect of group was
not significant (p = .634). Post hoc t tests using an ad-
justed significance level (.05/4 = .0125) examining the
four sets of ratings individually showed that the CHI
group tended to judge sarcasm less likely than the control
group with familiar people, t (35) = 2.55, p = .015, but
not with strangers, t (35) = 0.87, p = .389; and that they
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t (23.42) = 2.67, p = .014, but not in informal situations,
t(31.12) = 0.52, p = .607.
3.4. Relationship between sarcasm tasks and other
measures
For the CHI group, Pearson product moment corre-
lations were carried out to investigate the relationship
between sarcasm comprehension scores and perfor-
mance on the mentalistic and social usage measures.
There was a significant correlation between sarcasm
comprehension scores and mentalistic action compre-
hension scores, r = .51, p = .026, but not with physical
event comprehension scores, r = .24, p = .318. The cor-
relations between sarcasm comprehension scores and
the social usage task were not significant for difference
ratings either for familiar/unfamiliar people, r = .24,
p = .338, or for formal/informal places, r = .04,
p = .875. Correlations for sarcasm comprehension with
age at injury, years since injury, and severity of severity
of injury as defined by classification of post-traumatic
amnesia were not significant.4. Discussion
The main prediction, that CHI would be linked to
difficulties in interpreting sarcastic versus sincere re-
marks, was confirmed. Moreover, their difficulties in
processing sarcasm were related to mentalising abili-
ties, but not to social knowledge. No significant
differences were found for comprehension of direct
versus indirect sarcasm. Examination of errors
showed that the CHI participants rarely made literal
errors in processing sarcasm; they more often gave
incorrect non-literal interpretations. Inferences about
localisation of damage underpinning any deficits
cannot of course be drawn from the present data.
Frontal lobe dysfunction is assumed to be the main
mechanism underlying poor performance, since dam-
age to the orbital and lateral frontal lobes typically
occurs after injuries of this nature, regardless of the
particular site of impact (Ommaya, Grubb, & Nau-
mann, 1971), although other factors including right
hemisphere damage or diffuse axonal injury could of
course play a part.
Initial comparison of verbal scores for the sarcastic
and sincere remarks showed that the sarcastic remarks
were slightly more difficult than the sincere remarks
for the control group, who were close to ceiling level
for the sincere items when verbal interpretation scores
were considered, although no differences were found in
response times or scores for selection between alterna-
tives. The type of measure used to assess performance
is clearly a factor, since only the verbal response scoreswere sensitive to any differences between the sarcastic
and sincere materials. Studies using only measures such
as selection between alternatives, ratings or yes/no ques-
tions may not detect subtle differences in processing sar-
castic versus sincere materials. Moreover, when verbal
response measures are considered, some studies have
shown that sarcasm lends itself to a variety of interpre-
tations, even amongst normal adults (McDonald, 1999).
Comparison of the CHI and control groups on the
sarcastic versus sincere items showed that the CHI
group was differentially impaired on the sarcastic items
relative to controls. This is consistent with previous find-
ings in adults after CHI using shorter direct sarcastic
items (McDonald & Pearce, 1996). CHI participants in
the present study also differed marginally from the con-
trol group in processing sincere remarks. This might re-
flect slight pragmatic difficulties in determining whether
the sincere meanings were intended in the social context
of the story, since even remarks that are meant sincerely
may be open to a degree of interpretation, especially
since the sincere items were presented mixed in with sar-
castic remarks that were not intended sincerely. There
might also minor difficulties in other cognitive domains
not related to pragmatic language processing such as
syntactic or semantic language, long-term memory or
visuoperceptual skills. However, dysphasic patients were
excluded from the study, and a comprehension screening
test was used; the memory demands of the task were
minimised by leaving the relevant materials on display
throughout; and all participants were able to read the
verbal materials.
One aim of the present study was to elucidate the nat-
ure of the errors made by adult CHI participants in pro-
cessing sarcastic material. McDonald and Pearce (1996)
described only literal errors in their CHI participants in
response to direct sarcasm. However, Gibbs (2002) as-
serted that any errors on these materials were inevitably
literal in nature, since the nature of the task precluded
other types of errors. Examination of errors on our
more complex test materials in the present study showed
that only a small proportion of the errors made by the
CHI group reflected literal, sincere interpretations.
More commonly, there was evidence that the non-literal
nature of the communication had been detected, but
that interpretation of the precise non-literal meaning
was limited or incorrect. Although rare, literal errors
were more common for the CHI group than for controls
when asked to explain the meanings of the sarcastic re-
marks. For instance, literal interpretations of the direct
sarcastic example shown in Methods above relating to
the disappointing theatre play included ‘‘She thought
it was a fantastic play.’’ Literal interpretations of the
indirect sarcastic example relating to the girl who
wanted to watch the horror film included ‘‘She thought
her mum would prefer her to play with her dolls.’’ As
mentioned above, these literal errors were less frequent
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ure of the communication, but were nevertheless either
clearly incorrect or inadequate to score full credit. For
instance, incorrect non-literal interpretations of direct
sarcastic remarks included ‘‘She was being polite to
her friend because her friend liked it’’ for the theatre
play item. Incorrect non-literal interpretations for the
indirect sarcastic remarks included ‘‘She was joking with
her mother; she has to find something else to do’’ for the
horror film item. The findings therefore suggest that
adult CHI participants are often able to recognise that
a meaning is non-literal, although they do not always ar-
rive at a correct interpretation of these.
Comprehension of the remarks was also examined by
asking participants to choose from alternative meanings
supplied to them, removing the need to generate appro-
priate interpretations. In this component of the task the
CHI group performed slightly below the control group,
who were around ceiling levels, but nevertheless showed
few difficulties in selecting appropriate sarcastic or sin-
cere alternatives. If participants entertained a literal
hypothesis as to the meaning, they should have endorsed
the literal alternative. However, literal errors were rare,
consistent with the above findings from the free verbal
responses that participants in both groups most com-
monly understood that the communication was non-lit-
eral, even if the precise meaning eluded them initially.
By contrast, recent work (Channon et al., in prepara-
tion) found that the errors made by young children
presented with alternative literal and non-literal inter-
pretations of sarcastic remarks were most commonly lit-
eral in nature. This highlights potential differences
between pragmatic language comprehension failure
resulting from adult-acquired impairment and that
attributable to developmental immaturity.
Mentalising skills were investigated in the present
study using a task similar in structure to the sarcasm
comprehension task. The findings revealed selective
impairment in the CHI group when asked to explain hu-
man actions compared to control physical events. Exam-
ples of errors for the action item involving the girlfriend
eating a second helping of the burnt meal her boyfriend
cooked included ‘‘She likes burnt food’’ and ‘‘Probably
because she was starving’’. Responses such as these were
judged to demonstrate incorrect or inadequate apprecia-
tion of the mental state of the protagonist. There were
also minor differences when participants were asked to
select amongst alternative explanations for the actions/
events, since the control group but not the CHI group
performed at ceiling on both item types. This is consis-
tent with previous findings in CHI using higher-level
tasks that involved both mentalising and pragmatic lan-
guage processing (e.g., Channon & Watts, 2003; Levine
et al., 1993; Milders et al., 2003). Since impaired mental-
ising is likely to contribute to difficulties in the processing
of sarcastic materials, the relationship between this andsarcasm comprehension was examined using correla-
tional analysis. This cannot of course determine causal
relationships, and must be treated with caution particu-
larly in studies with small sample sizes. Nevertheless,
the findings did suggest a relationship with mentalising,
since performance on the human action comprehension
items, but not the control physical event items, correlated
significantly with sarcasm comprehension. The sarcasm
comprehension items were similar in structure to both
the action comprehension and physical event items, so
this alone does not appear sufficient to account for the
correlation only with the mentalistic action items. The
action and event items differed primarily in the nature
of the inferences required to solve them, since the action
items involved understanding of peoples mental states.
These findings are consistent with those of several previ-
ous studies that have linked mentalising ability to sar-
casm comprehension in children (Sullivan et al., 1995;
Winner & Leekam, 1991) and in adults with right hemi-
sphere lesions (Winner et al., 1998). Moreover, McDon-
ald (2000) reported that patients with traumatic brain
injury could understand direct sarcastic remarks when
the reversal of meaning involved only factual informa-
tion, such as: Tom: ‘‘Thats a big dog.’’ Monica: ‘‘Yes,
its a miniature poodle,’’ but not direct sarcastic remarks
involving mentalistic concepts, such as Mark: ‘‘What a
great football game,’’ followed byWayne: ‘‘Sorry I made
you come.’’
Although the contribution of mentalising skills has
been considered in the present study, there are other
possible contributory factors including executive skills,
linked primarily to lateral prefrontal networks. Some
previous studies have examined the relationship between
executive skills and pragmatic language processing in
patients with CHI (see Body, Perkins, & McDonald,
1999; for a review). For instance, tests including the
Wisconsin card-sorting test and Trail-making test have
shown correlations with performance on pragmatic
measures including comprehension of sarcasm and
ambiguity (e.g., McDonald & Pearce, 1996; Pearce
et al., 1998). Thus, there may be multiple routes to
impaired processing of sarcastic materials after CHI,
including deficient mentalising (theory of mind) abilities
or executive skills (see Martin & McDonald, 2003; for a
discussion).
The present study also explored knowledge relating
to social usage of sarcasm as a possible contributory
factor in pragmatic comprehension. The CHI group ap-
peared less aware than the control group of differentia-
tions between familiar/informal and unfamiliar/formal
situations and people in the everyday usage of sarcasm.
Since the groups were matched in age, IQ and educa-
tion, and CHI was adult-acquired in all cases, it seems
improbable that these differences existed prior to the
brain injury. The contribution of social knowledge to
pragmatic processing depends both on the quality of
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can be readily identified and accessed online when
needed. Impaired performance in the CHI group may
reflect some loss of social knowledge, and/or reduced
efficiency in making adequate use of such knowledge
to guide performance as a result of deficient strategic
memory search. However, examination of the correla-
tions with sarcasm comprehension scores for the CHI
group did not correlate significantly with knowledge of
social usage of sarcasm. This showed no evidence of a
direct link between impairments in processing sarcastic
material and social knowledge. However, the task used
here to evaluate social knowledge may have been inade-
quate to capture the extent of any difficulties experi-
enced by the CHI participants.
The study also investigated whether the CHI group
showed greater difficulty understanding indirect com-
pared to direct sarcastic remarks. Previous work has
found evidence of differences in comprehension of these
two types of sarcasm in typically developing children
aged 6 or above (Bosco et al., 2004). However, in con-
trast with this, the findings from the present study sug-
gested direct and indirect sarcasm to be similarly
impaired after CHI. Taken together with the findings
described above relating to the nature of the errors made
by CHI participants, this suggests that sarcasm process-
ing deficits after adult-acquired brain injury cannot be
modelled on stages derived from developmental data.
Greater difficulty in processing indirect versus direct sar-
casm in children may be related to their evolving mental-
ising abilities. Mentalising difficulties acquired in
adulthood after attaining an adult level of skill are unli-
kely to resemble those of children who have not reached
the full adult level of development. An explanation for
the lack of difference between the two types of sarcasm
in the present study could be derived from Gibbs
(2002) theory of sarcasm processing, which contends
that comprehension is guided by the social context. On
this assumption, given a sufficiently rich context, a lis-
tener would not necessarily be sensitive to the differences
between direct and indirect sarcasm. The use of much
briefer contexts than those employed in the present
study may produce differences between direct and indi-
rect sarcasm in adults. However, losing the detailed
story contexts would reduce the ecological validity of
the task, since everyday social interaction does not take
place in a vacuum.
In conclusion, CHI participants in the present study
showed impaired ability to comprehend sarcastic mate-
rial, in line with previous work, although type of sarcas-
tic materials did not influence performance. Our findings
revealed that errors in processing sarcasm are not al-
ways literal in nature, but often reflect incorrect or inad-
equate non-literal processing. CHI participants
frequently showed some appreciation of the non-literal
nature of the sarcastic communications, but this in itselfwas not necessarily sufficient to achieve correct interpre-
tations. As has previously been reported for other pop-
ulations, there was evidence of an association between
mentalising skills and sarcasm comprehension, suggest-
ing mentalising to be a route to impairment after brain
injury. It is of course necessary to bear in mind that
CHI is likely to reflect heterogeneous routes to impair-
ment in pragmatic language processing, since the sever-
ity and extent of any impairments in potential
constituent skills including mentalising, social knowl-
edge and executive skills may vary substantially between
individuals. Future work needs to address each of these
domains to extend our knowledge of sarcasm
comprehension.References
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